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WHAT ARE EXCESS RESERVES, AND WHY MIGHT THEY MATTER?
The most recent H.3 release from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board") shows excess reserves of about $1.794 trillion (data as of April 17, 2013 , and most recent data from that date). The current level of excess reserves is the highest ever reached in nominal, real (inflation-adjusted), and relative terms, by a factor of multiple whole integers.
Total reserves now are $1.905 trillion, with about $112 billion of required reserves. Only the level of required reserves could be considered normal in any historical context.
Excess reserves are the surplus of reserves against deposits and certain other liabilities that depository institutions (loosely called "banks") hold above the amounts that the Board requires within ranges set by federal law. The general requirement is that covered institutions maintain reserves at least equal to ten percent of liabilities payable on demand. For the first time in history, there is statistical evidence that as much as one-half or more of excess reserves are held for United States banking offices of foreign banks.
This working paper looks at excess reserves in historical context and analyzes whether they constitute a monetary policy problem for the Federal Reserve System (the "Fed") or a potentially inflationary problem for the rest of us. Generally, this analysis shows that both the absolute and relative size of excess reserves are a big problem for the Fed as well as the general public because of their inflationary potential. However, like all contingencies, the timing and the extent of the damage that reserve-driven inflation might cause are uncertain. It is even possible today to find articles in both scholarly circles and the popular press arguing either that the inflationary blow-off might never happen or that an increasing tendency toward prolonged deflation is the more probable outcome.
The Fed has fewer effective and politically palatable policy tools than its public statements indicate for dealing with excess reserves of the current magnitude. If the Fed were willing to take politically painful policy actions when the need arose, it could deal with the excess reserves effectively. Unfortunately, an ineffective response arising from a desire simply to muddle through is more likely, thereby giving rise to unacceptable levels of inflation, followed by tighter credit conditions and, finally, fewer sustainable employment opportunities because of weak domestic investment.
WHAT ARE BANK RESERVES GENERALLY?
In banking systems over the last 350 years or so, human experience has taught that banks (persons or institutions accepting deposits of money and promising to redeem them in money on demand or at a stated future time) may need to retain reserves against deposits. Reasonable people can disagree about the nature and proportional amount of those reserves, ranging from zero (a classical position associated with the free banking movement) to 100 percent (generally a 20th-century concept called "safe banking" or "narrow banking").
The nature of banking reserves depends on the legal and institutional structure of the banking system. Frequently encountered historical reserves include gold and silver coin or bullion, full-faith-and-credit securities of the US Treasury, coins and currency issued by the Treasury, and foreign currency and coins granted lawful-money status under applicable law. In countries with central banks, deposit accounts at the central banks are reserves of banks that hold those accounts. Most of the current reserves of the US banking system are deposit accounts held at the Federal Reserve banks.
Correspondent banking arrangements also may play a role in reserve management. A larger bank's reserve account at the central bank may include pass-through reserves held for smaller banks. In the US, before the creation of the Fed in 1913, national banks (in existence since 1863) were required to maintain reserve accounts at designated reserve city banks, and these banks, in turn, were required to maintain reserve accounts at banks in any of three cities: New York, Chicago, and St. Louis (central reserve cities).
At various times in US history, as well as currently, vault cash (funds held as coins or currency at banks and at approved armored carrier companies) counted as reserves and could be used to satisfy the entirety of any statutory or regulatory reserve requirement. Before the onset of the current financial crisis in the fall of 2008, vault cash frequently satisfied all the reserve requirement for smaller banks and usually between 80 and 90 percent of the requirement for the entire US banking system. Reserve accounts held at the Federal Reserve banks often were little more than clearing accounts covering the settlement of checks and wire transfers of funds.
Under current rules, primarily the Board's Regulation D (12 CFR Part 204), depository institutions are required to hold reserves equal to ten percent of their demand liabilities, which includes checking and other accounts subject to withdrawal by orders to pay third parties. Since 4 the 1970s, however, banks have devised increasingly creative ways to enable depositors to have accounts with ready access for withdrawal or for transfer to third parties that technically are not demand liabilities (for example, "sweep accounts"). The rise of these accounts has led some commentators to suggest that reserves have lost their traditional function of constituting a liquidity backstop for the banking system and that a modern banking system could function reasonably well with no required reserves at all. However, most such commentary was published before the present crisis, and there is a general move among banking system supervisors now to increase the liquidity requirement for banks. Central bank reserves satisfy at least a significant part of that liquidity requirement.
HOW THE FED CREATES EXCESS RESERVES
The Fed creates reserves both passively and directly. When the Federal Reserve banks began operations after 1914, member banks initially deposited the reserves then required (13 percent of demand liabilities) at their Federal Reserve banks. Depository institutions beginning operations today essentially do the same thing.
The original purpose for discount window assistance from the Federal Reserve banks was to enable member banks to maintain required reserves. Banks deposit approved forms of collateral for advances with the Federal Reserve banks, and then the Federal Reserve banks lend the amounts that banks request within the valuation limits of that collateral. In this example, the Fed creates new reserves for the banking system through the discount window. 
THE GREAT INCREASE OF EXCESS RESERVES
The monetary part of the Fed's overall balance sheet ("factors affecting reserve balances") has programs that its purchases of securities do little or nothing to increase the quantity of bank credit actually supplied to the general economy. Purchase programs might make sense in some circumstances if they helped make real interest rates positive, but generally real rates have been negative since 1Q2009. The Fed's methodology is not necessarily entirely irrational, but the evidence is that it simply has not worked.
RECENT SIGNS OF LIFE IN BANK LENDING AND MONETARY AGGREGATES
After several years of comparative inactivity, bank lending activity for commercial and 1 The Fed's definition of M1 is the sum of (1) currency outside bank vaults, (2) traveler's checks of nonbank issuers, (3) customers' demand deposits at commercial banks (with minor deductions), and (4) other checkable deposits, like negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) and automatic transfer service (ATS) accounts. Basically, this is currency held by the public plus demand deposit balances outside the Fed. M2 consists of M1 plus (1) savings deposits (including money market deposit accounts), (2) small-denomination time deposits (less than $100,000), and (3) balances in retail money market mutual funds. Individual retirement account (IRA) and Keogh account balances are excluded from M2. Excess reserves, required reserves, clearing balances held at the Federal Reserve banks, and the like, are components of the Fed's monetary base but would constitute double-counting of the same factors if included in M1 and other monetary aggregates. Such accounts are readily spendable media of exchange (transaction accounts), but counterparts of these accounts already are included in M1, for example, as components of customers' demand deposits at commercial banks. The quantities of liquidity to fear for inflationary consequences are either monetary base or M1/M2, but not both simultaneously. 
THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE WITH EXCESS RESERVES IS LARGELY SIMILAR
The continental European and US experiences with excess reserves since the onset of the present crisis have been similar, making allowances for the importance of the Greek financial crisis in causing expansive monetary efforts in Europe. Using the balance sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB) as a source of data analogous to the US data cited above, the measures below are presented. The ECB raised its required reserve during the second week of July 2012, when excess reserves stood at 1.006 trillion euros. At that point, the ECB's balance sheet also was much larger, 3.085 trillion euros. Initially, about one-half of the excess was absorbed into the pool of required reserves, and the overall balance sheet then began to shrink toward the current level.
Otherwise, the ECB experience has been roughly comparable to the Fed's experience: Much monetary creation and much expansion of the balance sheet and monetary base producing comparatively little credit expansion. In Europe, M3 (Table 1, What is different about this experience is that the Fed is paying interest on these excess reserves. . . . What the Fed could do that it could not do before is to make that interest rate negative. Even a zero rate for excess reserves would be helpful. It would make lending more attractive to banks and put us back into the regime that monetarists have investigated in the past. A negative rate would break new ground. Excess reserves should pay less than the Fed funds rate to avoid subsidization. Excess reserves currently are more attractive than selling them as Fed funds because they can be rolled over at no cost and can be liquidated without waiting for a day to pass. Currently, banks receive a higher interest rate from holding excess reserves than from holding three-month Treasury bills. As long as the interest rates on reserves and risk-free assets are similar and banks' demand for risk-free assets does not decline, there is no obvious reason why excess reserves will decline.
The market interest rate on three-month Treasury bills has been around 0.06 percent for several weeks at this writing (it was 0.09 percent in March 2013) and generally has been at comparable rates (well below 0.25 percent) since 2009. Professor Kane's observation and Mr.
Dwyer's prediction generally have been borne out.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1930s WITH EXCESS RESERVES
The only prior occasion in Federal Reserve history when there were large and lasting amounts of excess reserves was, as one might expect, during the 1930s. They were not a factor in the formulation of Fed policy on money and credit throughout the 1920s. Interest-earning excess reserves constitute an administrative problem for the Fed and are a drain on net federal income as long as the Fed pays interest on them (the Fed's interest payments reduce its own income and, thus, the "interest on Federal Reserve notes" paid to the Treasury). Real rates of return have to become positive for borrowers to identify projects for 2 Sources cited begin with Friedman and Schwartz (1963 contraction. The 1930s experience shows that it can take a long time to dispose of excess reserves (a decade then). Also, with federal budget deficits continuing to run about $1 trillion a year, having the Fed sell about $180 billion a year of (preferably) mortgage-backed securities and longer maturity Treasury securities should be feasible and comparatively non-disruptive to market demand for Treasury paper: At this rate, the amount of securities added to the market by Fed sales would add to supply only at the margin.
The ECB took important steps to reduce its own excess reserves in mid-2012 by increasing required reserves so as to move about one-half of the total into the category of required reserves. At this writing, however, Europe generally is viewed as experiencing an economic recession. Other factors are in play there, too, including threats of civil and political disorder in several countries, but raising the level of bank reserves could reduce the overall level of bank credit available for lending to productive enterprises, thereby making the European recession worse. Europe also is more dependent on bank credit day-to-day than countries like the United States or, to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom with established securities markets.
In any case, disposing of excess reserves would remove a temptation for an easy path to It may turn out that there are no policies that could resist the depressive effects of external events beyond US control on the US banking system, ranging from military engagements abroad to bank failure (domestic or foreign), Japanese money creation and currency devaluation, or sovereign debt default in Europe. But it would be a policy mistake not to begin now to try to offset the domestic economic drag of excess reserves while awaiting more bad news from abroad.
In the 1930s, after all, gold flows fleeing political turmoil in Europe helped create the In the United States, the excess reserves of the 1930s went away when banks were offered government-guaranteed lending alternatives requiring a lot of new investment, in that case involving the funding of defense production loans. Any comparable program today probably should aim at encouraging banks to move reserves into an activity that would draw down the monetary base (reserves held at the Fed), but would not expand the money supply (monetary aggregates created by the banks themselves).
In light of the vast quantity of excess reserves, it would be desirable to identify a few major programs that would be desirable in their own right and that could absorb a lot or all of the excess reserves if they were accompanied by government guarantees. Two such programs immediately come to mind: Refinancing all student loans (now in excess of $1 trillion) or refinancing pre-2009 mortgages that are in default or heading for foreclosure (probably between $2.2 and $2.5 trillion). The time horizon for mortgages to be considered for refinancing could be extended as far as year-end 2012 (the commencement of the present QE program) if not enough qualified borrowers emerged. Qualified borrowers should have negative equity in their houses not in excess of ten percent and should be offered financing terms up to ten or 15 years at a fixed rate set slightly in excess of the Treasury's borrowing costs for bonds of equal maturity. In any case, the repayment schedule should be set so that the borrower would reach positive equity based on current home values within ten years.
